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Background: During the initial COVID-19 response, Germany’s Federal Government implemented several
nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) that were instrumental in suppressing early exponential spread of
SARS-CoV-2. NPI effect on the transmission of other respiratory viruses has not been examined at the
national level thus far.
Methods: Upper respiratory tract specimens from 3580 patients with acute respiratory infection (ARI), col-
lected within the nationwide German ARI Sentinel, underwent RT-PCR diagnostics for multiple respiratory
viruses. The observation period (weeks 1-38 of 2020) included the time before, during and after a far-reach-
ing contact ban. Detection rates for different viruses were compared to 2017-2019 sentinel data (15350 sam-
ples; week 1-38, 11823 samples).
Findings: The March 2020 contact ban, which was followed by a mask mandate, was associated with an
unprecedented and sustained decline of multiple respiratory viruses. Among these, rhinovirus was the single
agent that resurged to levels equalling those of previous years. Rhinovirus rebound was first observed in chil-
dren, after schools and daycares had reopened. By contrast, other nonenveloped viruses (i.e. gastroenteritis
viruses reported at the national level) suppressed after the shutdown did not rebound.
Interpretation: Contact restrictions with a subsequent mask mandate in spring may substantially reduce
respiratory virus circulation. This reduction appears sustained for most viruses, indicating that the activity of
influenza and other respiratory viruses during the subsequent winter season might be low,whereas rhinovi-
rus resurgence, potentially driven by transmission in educational institutions in a setting of waning popula-
tion immunity, might signal predominance of rhinovirus-related ARIs.
Funding: Robert Koch-Institute and German Ministry of Health.






Surveillanceestr. 10, D-13353 Berlin, Ger-
Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)1. Introduction
Acute respiratory viral infections are an important cause of mor-
bidity and mortality worldwide, especially in vulnerable individuals.
Virological surveillance of respiratory infections, ideally done in sen-
tinel studies that are based on a statistically representative selectionof geographically distinct clinics, is key to monitoring the prevalence,
seasonal patterns and genetic diversity of the causative agents. Phar-
maceutic treatment options for most respiratory viruses remain lim-
ited, which renders particular importance to public health measures
that prevent their spread, namely nonpharmaceutical interventions
(NPIs) [1,2][4,5]. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the impact of NPIs,
implemented on a nationwide scale, on the circulation of respiratory
viruses has been vastly unknown. During the first wave of the pan-
demic, it emerged that NPIs impacted not only SARS-CoV-2 but also
RESEARCH IN CONTEXT
Evidence before this study
Nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) introduced in early 2020
during the first wave of COVID-19 have appeared to affect the
spread of infections with respiratory viruses other than SARS-CoV-
2. This became first apparent when influenza activity decreased
substantially during Southern hemisphere winter. Virological sur-
veillance data characterizing the effect of NPIs on respiratory
viruses other than influenza at the national level is still scarce.
Added value of this study
The laboratory-based virological surveillance program at the
German National Influenza Centre monitors the circulation of
multiple respiratory viruses, including human rhinovirus
(HRV), an agent that remains unconsidered in many sentinel
studies. Molecular diagnostic data on over 15000 specimens
from 2017-2020 indicates the NPIs implemented during the
early German COVID-19 response decreased the activity of all
established respiratory viruses in an unprecedented and pro-
longed fashion. The single virus that rebounded to the levels of
previous years was human rhinovirus.
Implications of all the available evidence
This data indicates that nonpharmaceutical interventions,
including a temporary strict contact ban and the use of face
masks, may be effective at lowering respiratory viral disease
burden. Although it is difficult to disentangle the contribution
of specific interventions and certain confounders can not be
entirely ruled out, the public health measures implemented to
curb the spread of COVID-19 in 2020 may have profoundly
impacted even the subsequent winter season, potentially con-
ditioning low influenza but consistent rhinovirus activity.
2 D.-Y. Oh et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 6 (2021) 100112influenza virus [3,4] with a pronounced decline of influenza activity
during Southern hemisphere winter [5-7]; and that pediatric hospi-
talizations due to non-COVID-19 respiratory illnesses decreased sub-
stantially [8,9]. However, national-level lab-based surveillance data
characterizing the effect of NPIs on multiple respiratory viruses is
currently scarce to the best of our knowledge.
The first German COVID-19 cases, detected in late January, were
successfully contained [10,11] and the general consensus is that the
pandemic arrived later in Germany than in many other European
countries. However, several clusters, related to returning travelers
and local carnival celebrations were formed in February and resulted
in epidemic spread of SARS-CoV-2. In an effort to counter the expo-
nential rise of cases, the German Federal Government deployed a
series of concerted NPIs, resulting in a notable reduction of the SARS-
CoV-2 spreading rate [1]. Here we describe how the restrictions sup-
pressed not only the spread of SARS-CoV-2 but also that of other viral
pathogens, based on 2017-2020 virological data from Germany’s
national sentinel system for monitoring ARIs, particularly influenza.2. Methods
2.1. Virological sentinel
Laboratory-based virological surveillance is a key instrument in
Germany’s national sentinel system for monitoring acute respiratory
infections (ARI), particularly influenza1. Figure 1 shows the1 https://influenza.rki.degeographical distribution of sentinel clinics over the entire German
territory. More than 1 % of primary care physicians participate in the
sentinel and thus over 1% of the population is represented [12,13].
Approximately 20% of sentinel physicians in geographically represen-
tative practices nationwide are asked to systematically sample ambu-
latory patients presenting with ARI / influenza-like illness,
prioritizing those with fever or other systemic signs of illness [14].
The ARI case definition (acute respiratory disease with at least one of
the four following symptoms: fever, cough, rhinorrhoea or sore
throat) has been maintained throughout, even after COVID 19
became a pandemic. Sentinel physicians collect upper respiratory
specimens (mostly, nasal or pharyngeal swabs) from ambulatory
patients. Specimens undergo molecular diagnostics at the German
National Influenza Center, where presence of influenza virus A/B (IV),
human respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), metapneumovirus (HMPV),
rhinovirus (HRV), parainfluenzavirus (PIV, since 2020) and SARS-
CoV-2 (since 2020) are routinely assessed, as outlined in the section
Laboratory analyses below. Thus, lab-based surveillance for influenza,
a notifiable illness, is complemented with lab-based surveillance for
a range of non-notifiable viral respiratory diseases [12,15-17]. This
virological sentinel enables monitoring the spread of a broad spec-
trum of respiratory RNA viruses at the national level; respiratory RNA
viruses have public health relevance because they belong to viral
families that are considered to have potential to trigger pandemics
[18]. Sample Numbers: The sentinel is designed so that during the
summer season, when between 30 and 100 samples per week are
analyzed, there is a 95% probability that viruses are detected with
prevalences among tested individuals exceeding 3% (100 samples)
-12% (30 samples). Conversely, if we do not detect a virus we can
state that its true prevalence lies with 95% confidence within the
interval 0  11.35% (30 samples/week) and 0  3.70% (100 samples/
week). As ARI activity increases during each winter season, higher
sample numbers are collected by the sentinel physicians and more
samples undergo lab analysis, usually ranging from 100 at the very
minimum to ca. 400 samples per week. Higher numbers of samples
examined result in higher sensitivity of the sentinel, allowing us to
detect emerging outbreaks at a lower prevalence and therefore ear-
lier (see also Supplementary Figure S1).
2.2. Ethics statement
Written and informed consent was obtained from all sentinel
patients. All investigations were conducted according to the princi-
ples expressed in the Helsinki Declaration. Written approval for the
German national surveillance of influenza and other respiratory
viruses was obtained from the Charite-Universit€atsmedizin Berlin
Ethical Board (reference EA2/126/11) and sentinel surveillance is cov-
ered by German legislation (x13, x14, Protection against Infection
Act). All analyses were based on pseudonymised data.
2.3. Laboratory analyses
2.3.1. Sample preparation, viral RNA extraction and c-DNA synthesis
Sample preparation, viral RNA extraction and c-DNA synthesis
were performed as previously described [12,15-17,19]. Briefly, nasal
or oropharyngeal swabs(Copan Diagnostics, Murrieta, United States)
were sent to the National Influenza Centre, where 3 mL of cell culture
medium [minimum essential medium (MEM) with N-2-hydroxye-
thylpiperazine-N-2-ethane sulfonic acid (HEPES) buffer with 5,000U/
mL PenStrep)] were added to wash out the attached viruses. RNA
was extracted from 200 mL sample material, employing the MagNA
Pure 96 DNA and Viral NA Small Volume Kit (Roche, Mannheim, Ger-
many) or the MagNA Pure 24 Total NA Isolation Kit and eluting in 50
mL buffer. For c-DNA synthesis in a total volume of 40 mL, 25mL RNA,
random hexamer primers and 200UMoloney murine leukaemia virus
(M-MLV) Reverse Transcriptase (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham,
Fig. 1. Spatial Distribution of Sentinel Clinics over Germany. Shown are the geographical locations of clinics participating in the national sentinel system for monitoring acute
respiratory infections (ARI), particularly influenza. High population density is reflected in high practice density. Different colors represent different specialties. GP, General Prac-
tioner.
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cling conditions: 42°C (5 min), 37°C (30 min) and 95°C (5 min). c-
DNA was diluted 1:1 with H2O for downstream PCR assays.
2.3.2. Modular real-time PCR assays for detection of respiratory viral
pathogens
For molecular diagnostic detection of IV-A, IV-B, RSV, HRV, HMPV,
PIV, SARS-CoV-2 and FCV (feline calicivirus, which serves as an inter-
nal process control), a real-time PCR system that is modular in design,
allowing to run reactions in singleplex or multiplex formats, is estab-
lished at the National Influenza Centre. This system includes previ-
ously described real-time PCR assays [12,15-17,19,20][6], which
were (i) modified to take new insights into genetic variation into
account and (ii) adapted to and extensively validated for the modular
design, where single- and multiplex reactions can be run under simi-
lar reaction conditions. PCRs were performed on LC480II real-time
PCR thermal cyclers (Roche, Basel, Switzerland) in 96- or 384-well
plates. Each reaction contained, in a total volume of 20mL, 1x PCRbuffer, 4mmol/L MgCl2, 1mmol/L deoxynucleoside triphosphate
(dNTP; Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, US) with deoxyuridine tri-
phosphate (dUTP; GE Healthcare, Chicago, US), 600ng bovine serum
albumin (BSA; Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, US), 0.3U (single-
plex) or 1U (multiplex) Platinum Taq Polymerase (Thermo Fisher Sci-
entific, Waltham, US), oligonucleotides as listed in Supplementary
Table S1 (Metabion, Planegg, Germany and Applied Biosystems, Fos-
ter City, USA), and 5mL of prediluted c-DNA. Thermocycling parame-
ters were as follows: 5 min at 95 °C for Taq DNA polymerase
activation and initial denaturation prior to a total 45 cycles consisting
of denaturation at 95 °C for 15 s and annealing at 60 °C for 30 s. Data
was analysed using the LightCycler software version 1.5.1.
2.4. Statistical analyses
To assess whether the frequencies of respiratory viruses observed
in each week of 2020 were significantly lower than in the preceding
years, we assumed that the detection of any respiratory virus follows
Table 1





March 9-12, 2020 11 Mild Physical Distancing:
Cancellation of mass gatherings, e.g. trade
fairs and soccer games
Calls to avoid social gatherings
Population mobility starts to decline.
March 16-18, 2020 12 Strong Physical Distancing:
Closure of schools, childcare facilities, many
businesses and cultural venues incl. bars /
clubs.
Nonessential international travel ban
March 23, 2020 13 Strict contact ban:
Prohibition of small gatherings of people not
from the same household
Closing of all nonessential businesses
Population mobility reaches nadir.
April 20, 2020 17 Federal Government begins process of easing
restrictions gradually, starting with the
reopening of small stores
April 27, 2020 18 Mask mandate in public spaces
May 6, 2020 19 Control of easing restrictions is transitioned
from Federal Government to state
governments
May 18, 2020 21 Many states begin stepwise reopening of
schools and daycare centers for limited
operations
June 15, 2020 25 Population mobility back up (>95% of 2019
levels).
Jul. 27- Aug. 8, 2020 31-32 Schools in almost all states closed for sum-
mer vacation
Table 2
Virological surveillance 2017-2020: Specimens and viral pathogen distribution
(weeks 1-38)
Year N Virus detected
IV A/B HRV HMPV RSV PIV SARS-CoV-2 2 none
2017 3876 1254 440 98 287 n/d n/d 57 1740
2018 4797 2087 379 208 180 n/d n/d 92 1851
2019 3150 1042 333 80 285 n/d n/d 56 1354
2020 3580 836 495 189 152 43 12 54 1799
IV A/B, human influenza virus A/B; RSV, respiratory syncytial virus; HMPV, human
metapneumovirus; HRV, human rhinovirus; PIV, parainfluenzavirus; SARS-CoV-2,
SARS coronavirus 2; 2, more than one virus detected; n/d, not done .
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mined accordingly (binomial test), to test whether there were signifi-
cantly less respiratory viruses in 2020 compared to X = 2017, -18, -19
respectively. The combined P-value for assessing whether respiratory
virus detections in 2020 were significantly lower than in all of the
previous years 2017-19 was then computed as:
P-Value = 1-[(1-Pvalue_20vs.17)*(1-Pvalue_20vs.18)*(1-Pva-
lue_20vs.19)].
In addition, Pvalue_20vs.17, Pvalue_20vs.18 and Pvalue_20vs.19
were determined using the Fisher Exact test and combined P-values
were calculated using an analogous approach.
2.5. Changes in mobility
Based on recent work indicating that mobility may be used as an
indicator for the strength of lockdownmeasures in multiple countries
(i.e. the rate with which social contacts are effectively reduced [21]
and a proxy indicator for the adoption rate of other non-compulsory
and non-medical interventions [22], mobility may be considered as
an indicator for changes in the population that affect the infection
dynamics [23]. Therefore, 2020 mobility data is displayed in order to
provide additional context for the 2020 respiratory virus surveillance
data. To this end, changes in mobility were calculated based on
mobility flows collected from mobile phone data: The total number
of trips in a given 2020 week was compared to the total number of
trips during the corresponding week in 2019. Mobility change calcu-
lations have been described in considerable detail elsewhere [21,24].
2.6. Use of disease notification data
To complement findings from the virological surveillance with
information on the circulation of non-respiratory viruses, which are
not covered by our lab-based surveillance, we used data from the sys-
tem for surveillance of notifiable infectious diseases. Briefly, the Pro-
tection Against Infection Act determines which infectious diseases
(x6, notifications by medical doctors) and which detected pathogens
(x7, notifications by laboratories) are notifiable in Germany; for each
notifiable disease case definitions exist that involve epidemiological,
clinical and laboratory criteria [25,26]. The SurvStat@RKI 2.0 online
tool [27], was used on November 9, 2020 to provide aggregated data
regarding seasonal influenza, norovirus gastroenteritis and rotavirus
gastroenteritis reported to local or federal public health authorities
between week 1, 2017 and week 38, 2020.
2.7. Role of the funding source
These investigations were funded by Robert Koch-Institute and
German Ministry of Health. The authors had sole responsibility for
the design and execution of the study, the collection, analysis and
interpretation of data and the preparation of the manuscript.
3. Results
3.1. Timeline of NPIs
Governmental NPIs were introduced in a stepwise fashion, begin-
ning with cancellation of mass gatherings, which was followed by
closure of schools, cultural venues and many businesses (week 11-
12; table 1). These physical distancing measures were increased in
week 13, when a strict, extensive contact ban was announced, which
included the prohibition of gatherings of people from different
households and the closure of all nonessential businesses. These
interventions were accompanied by marked decreases in population
mobility [21].
Careful lifting of restrictions began four weeks later, initially fol-
lowing a rather uniform approach determined by the federalgovernment; and then in more heterogeneous ways, which were
determined by each Bundesland (state) separately and thus varied
state-to-state. School and day-care center operations were gradually
resumed, depending on geography, beginning week 21, returning to
almost normal conditions by weeks 23-27, just prior to summer vaca-
tion (the start date of which also varies by geography). In addition,
most venues and businesses were allowed to reopen. Eased restric-
tions were reflected in increasing mobility, which was almost back at
2019 levels from week 25 on [21]. A mandatory mask requirement in
public spaces, effective week 18, was retained throughout, as were
physical distancing rules and hygiene measures introduced in the
very early phase of the German epidemic.3.2. Respiratory virus surveillance results in the context of NPIs
Specimens from 3580 patients with ARI symptoms, obtained by
sentinel physicians between January and September, 2020, were sent
to the National Influenza Center for lab-based respiratory virus sur-
veillance, using multiplex PCR analysis. Specimen numbers and diag-
nostic results were compared to data of corresponding weeks in the
three previous years (2017-2019; Table 2 and Supplementary Table
D.-Y. Oh et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 6 (2021) 100112 5S1). Sample counts displayed unusual re-increase starting week 10,
and generally exceeded 2018-2019 counts starting week 17 (Fig. 2a
and Suppl. Fig. S2b)2. SARS CoV-2 detection prevalence reflected
national COVID-19 incidence well, with highest prevalence (3.1%)
noted in samples collected in week 13, while 7-day-incidence of
reported cases peaked at 36064 in week 143. NPIs culminated in the
contact ban effective week 13, which is when sentinel detection
prevalence began to decline. From week 16 on, sentinel samples
remained SARS-CoV-2 negative, indicating sustained lowering of
SARS-CoV-2 epidemic activity (Fig. 2b and Suppl. Fig. S2b)[2].
NPIs appeared to be temporally associated with drastic declines in
the sentinel prevalence of other respiratory viruses: the percent posi-
tive tests in the sentinel in 2020 in weeks 12 and 14-22 were sub-
stantially lower than in the corresponding weeks of all previous
years. For weeks 14-22, this difference was highly statistically signifi-
cant (Fig. 2b, Suppl. Figure S2b [2] and Supplementary Table S3).
Specifically, a sharp decrease of the percent positive tests for influ-
enza was observed subsequent to NPI implementation; the last posi-
tive specimen of the season was obtained in week 14, a week after
the contact ban became effective. By contrast, during previous sea-
sons, influenza virus had been present in samples through weeks 22
(2017), 18 (2018) and 21 (2019). The last HMPV-positive specimen
was also from week 14; previously HMPV had been present through
weeks 38 (2017, Suppl. Figure S2b [2]), 31 (2018), and 33 (2019). RSV
sentinelprevalence fell below 2017-19 levels in week 14, two weeks
after day-care closures, with only sporadic detections afterwards.
Thus, NPI deployment was followed by earlier and/or more abrupt
ends to the 2020 influenza, HMPV and RSV seasons (Fig. 2b and
Suppl. Fig. S2b[2]).
Whereas restrictions were being lifted from week 17 on, respira-
tory virus activity in the sentinel practically ceased for eight weeks
with few sporadic RSV, HRV and PIV detections only. No respiratory
virus at all was detected in week 18 and week 22 samples. Rhinovirus
detection rates in previous years had surged immediately after influ-
enza season ended, but in 2020 they remained low through week 22.3.3. Rhinovirus is the only virus to resurge
Beginning in week 23, there was a notable uptick in the detection
prevalence of rhinovirus (Fig. 2b). Rhinovirus was the single sentinel
virus to not display lasting suppression and reach pre-COVID-19
detection levels. From week 27 on, detection rates exceeded those of
the previous years, with well over 60% of all samples testing positive
in weeks 28-30. Rhinovirus rebound was first observed in children,
about two weeks earlier than in older individuals (Fig. 2c; absolute
numbers corresponding to these percentages are provided in Suppl.
Fig. S4). A similar, albeit less pronounced, pattern of rhinovirus
increasing in children before it increased in adults was also observed
in the previous years (Suppl. Fig. S3 and Suppl. Fig. S4). In 2020, rhi-
novirus detection rates rose first while schools and daycare centers
were being reopened and dipped mildly from week 31 on, when
almost all states were on school vacation (Fig. 2b[2]).3.4. Case numbers of other viral infections in the context of NPIs
Contrary to other respiratory viruses, rhinoviruses do not have an
envelope. Thus, they display greater environmental stability and
transmission via fomites might play a greater role. To gain insight
into whether the different physicochemical properties of rhinovirus2 For reasons of clarity and legibility, Fig. 2 displays data from weeks 9-32. The full
observation period (weeks 1-38, 2020 and weeks 1-52, 2017-2019) is covered in Sup-
plementary Figure S2.
3 The observed one-week time lag corresponds to the usual delay between sampling
date (applied to virological surveillance specimens) and reporting date (on which posi-
tive lab results are relayed to Public Health Authorities).could explain its quick resurgence, we wished to assess the potential
impact of NPIs on the transmission of other non-enveloped viruses,
namely gastroenteritis viruses, which are not covered in our sentinel.
Therefore, we reviewed aggregated data on selected viral infections
reported to German public health authorities, using the SurvStat@RKI
2.0 online tool [27]. Consistent with the sentinel observations, NPI
deployment was followed by a decline in the number of reported
influenza infections (Fig. 3). Interestingly, the same was true for
infections with non-enveloped gastroenteritis viruses that are trans-
mitted fecal-orally and via fomites: The norovirus winter wave,
already in decline before NPI introduction, ended weeks earlier than
in previous years. Similarly, rotavirus notifications, which normally
peak in spring, were substantially less frequent than in 2017-2019.
This implies that greater environmental stability and different trans-
mission routes alone do not explain rhinovirus resurgence.
4. Discussion
In the context of the initial response to the first wave of the
COVID-19 pandemic in Germany, we have observed an unprece-
dented decline of all respiratory viruses in our laboratory-based
national surveillance system for ARIs. This decrease was temporally
associated with the implementation of far-reaching NPIs, including a
4 week contact ban followed by a mask mandate. This data aligns
well with the drastic decrease of notifications for a wide range of
infectious diseases observed during a similar time period in Germany,
which included numerous notifiable illnesses with a respiratory
transmission route, including influenza [26]. It is plausible and to be
expected that these findings reflect, at least in part, a true suppres-
sion of respiratory virus transmission and circulation, secondary to
the public health measures implemented to curb the spread of SARS-
CoV-2.
However, certain confounding factors must also be considered.
For example, especially in the initial phase of the pandemic, there
was a reluctance to seek medical care in the general population
[28,29], potentially resulting in fewer diagnoses and notifications of
respiratory virus infections. This aspect, discussed in depth by Ulrich
and colleagues [26], is also of importance with respect to the sharp
drop of aggregated notification data observed here for influenza and
noro-/ rotavirus (Fig. 3).
Several points support the assumption that there has been a true
decline in the burden of respiratory viral illness:
1. An internet-based participatory surveillance system, GrippeWeb,
established at RKI in 2006 to monitor ARI activity [30], revealed
that from weeks 13 to 27, the estimated weekly ARI rates were at
levels well below those of previous years [31,32]. This data is pro-
vided by voluntary participants in the general population, who do
not necessarily see a physician for their symptoms. Therefore, it
renders additional support to the hypothesis that the decreased
sentinel prevalence of respiratory viruses and decreased notifica-
tions of Influenza-/RSV- cases subsequent to NPI introduction rep-
resented indeed a true decline in respiratory virus circulation.
2. With respect to reports of other viral illnesses, these remained
low even after the vast majority of restrictions had been lifted and
mobility levels had returned to normal (Fig. 3) Thus, it appears
less likely that reluctance to seek healthcare during the pandemic
was the primary cause for decreased notifications.
3. Our findings align with observations made in other countries from
both Southern and Northern Hemisphere countries regarding a
premature end to the influenza season of 2019/20 [3-5,9,33].
4. Our virological surveillance study considers sentinel prevalence
(percent positive tests among patients presenting with ARI to
physicians’ offices) rather than absolute numbers, a parameter
that is considerably less affected by medical care underutilization
[34]. In addition, our study design calls for sentinel physicians to
Fig. 2. Respiratory virus surveillance results in the context of public health measures. Please note the complementary figures S2, S3 and S4 in the Supplementary section.
A. Specimen numbers per sampling week/ year. Each column represents the numbers of samples obtained from patients presenting with acute respiratory illness in the calen-
dar week indicated. Shades of grey / pink indicate the sampling year.
B. 2020 sentinel prevalence of respiratory viruses in the temporal context of NPIs and mobility, compared to 2017-2019 sentinel prevalence. Areas of colored segments in
each piechart represent the detection prevalence of a respiratory virus in samples obtained during the indicated week / year. Included is a 2020 mobility chart, displaying the rela-
tive change [%] in population mobility as compared to the corresponding 2019 week; an overview of NPIs; and summer vacation periods, which vary by region: each horizontal stag-
gered line represents the vacation block of one Bundesland (state). Asterisks denote statistical significance level of 2020 respiratory virus prevalence being lower than in 2017-2019:
**, p<0.005 based on both binomial and Fisher’s exact tests.
IV: Influenza A/B, HRV: Human Rhinovirus, RSV: Respiratory Syncytial Virus, HMPV: Human Metapneumovirus, PIV: Parainfluenzavirus, SARS-CoV-2: SARS Coronavirus 2, 0:
negative for the tested viruses, >1: more than 1 virus detected. Both PIV and SARS-CoV-2 were only tested for in 2020.
C. Rhinovirus rebound by age group. Heatmap diagram showing the percentage of rhinovirus-positive specimens by age group (Y-axis) and time (X-axis); time scale corre-
sponds to two-week-blocks in 2020.
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Fig. 3. Sustained decrease of case numbers for viral infections in 2020 and its temporal association with public health measures. Shown is the number of cases reported to
local or federal health authorities in 2017-2020 for each of three notifiable viral diseases: seasonal influenza, norovirus gastroenteritis (non-enveloped virus) and rotavirus gastro-
enteritis (non-enveloped virus). The public health measures in order to curb the spread of COVID-19 (table 1) are indicated. [27]
D.-Y. Oh et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 6 (2021) 100112 7swab patients fulfilling the ARI case definition, which has been
maintained throughout. In other words, unlike SARS-CoV-2 test-
ing criteria, which were loosened as national testing capacities
increased, the formal diagnostic approach applied to sentinel
patients has not changed during the observation period.An implication of our findings, together with those of Ullrich et al.
and observations from other countries [3-5,9,26] is that NPIs, fol-
lowed by a mask mandate, may have sustained impact on the circula-
tion of respiratory viruses. This impact may be more pronounced
during summer, when respiratory viral activity is low in general;
8 D.-Y. Oh et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 6 (2021) 100112however, similar effects were observed during Southern Hemisphere
winter [5-7]. This implies a beneficial effect of NPIs, given the sub-
stantial morbidity and mortality not only of COVID-19 and influenza,
but also other viral ARIs including RSV, one of the most important
agents of severe lower respiratory tract infections in young children
[35,36].
From a public health point of view, both short-term intense physi-
cal distancing measures and mask mandates should be considered as
means to decrease the burden of respiratory viral illness during
future winter season.
Once restrictions were being loosened, only rhinovirus appeared
to resurge topre-pandemic levels, similar to findings reported in
studies fromAustralia[7], England[37], Japan [2] and New Zealand [3].
In contrast to other respiratory viruses, which display distinct sea-
sonality with clear preponderance in winter, rhinoviruses circulate
throughout the year [38]. Whereas their relative prevalence
decreases in winter due to influenza interference, they are by far the
most prevalent respiratory viral agent during summer months
[39,40]. Additionally, rhinoviruses differ from other respiratory
viruses in that they are non-enveloped and thus more tenacious. The
relative contribution of different transmission routes and their varia-
tions between different viruses have thus far not been determined
conclusively [41,42]. It is possible that rhinovirus spread depends to
a larger part on fomite transmission, which is not prevented effec-
tively by masks. However, rhinovirus seasonality, tenacity, and
potentially different transmission route do not provide a sufficient
explanation for their resurgence, given that other unenveloped
viruses with spring / summer peaks and potential for fomite trans-
mission did not resurge: rotavirus, norovirus (Fig. 3) and enterovi-
rus4. Moreover, a similar pattern was reported from Australia, where
rhinovirus but not influenza rebounded during Southern Hemisphere
winter [7]. Furthermore, a recent study indicates that face masks
might be less efficient at filtering rhinoviruses out of exhaled breath
than they are at reducing influenza and seasonal coronaviruses [43];
though confirmatory studies are currently lacking, this may be con-
sidered as a factor contributing to rhinovirus rebound despite univer-
sal masking, particularly in adults.
For several weeks in the 2020 summer, rhinovirus detection prev-
alence exceeded that noted during corresponding weeks in previous
years. Similar observations have been made in New Zealand [3] and
Japan [2]. Potential explanations for this phenomenon include a com-
parative increase in diagnostic testing, where patients presenting
with relatively mild clinical symptoms, who in years prior to the pan-
demic would not have seen a physician, are swabbed; the substantial
decreases of all other respiratory viruses leading to relative overrep-
resentation of rhinovirus; and a high proportion of children being
tested, in whom rhinovirus infections occur frequently. In addition,
cross-serotype T-cell mediated immunity to rhinovirus exists [44]
and might require frequent boosting; lack of rhinovirus exposures
might in turn result in waning population immunity, increased sus-
ceptibility and higher prevalence of this agent. A similar effect of NPIs
- waning population immunity due to lack of exposure, ultimately
leading to very high incidence once restrictions are lifted - should be
anticipated with respect to other respiratory viruses and has also
been projected in a recent modelling study [34]. Robust ARI surveil-
lance and, for influenza, broad vaccination coverage should be
ensured during the coming seasons.
Rhinovirus rebound was first observed in pediatric samples,
which may be related to the higher susceptibility of children, who
are immunologically naïve to many rhinovirus serotypes. Children
are considered a natural reservoir of this viral agent, which easily
spreads in daycare centers and schools [45,46]. In addition, especially
small children are unable to follow physical distancing and common4 K. Keeren, personal communication on Oct. 9, 2020 (separate manuscript in
preparation).hygiene measures and masks are not readily available for younger
age groups. Rhinovirus detection rates started rising after school /
daycare reopenings, confirming a recent report by Poole et al., which
suggested that rhinovirus transmission is mainly driven by children
[37]. Respiratory virus transmission is generally common among chil-
dren, especially in school / daycare settings [47-49]. It is important
that these agents continue to be watched diligently in this age group.
One limitation to our study is that the behavioral or procedural
changes driven by the pandemic or measures to control it may have
influenced sentinel sampling. For example, sample counts exceeded
those of the previous years almost every week beginning in week 17,
2020. A potential explanation might be heightened public awareness
lowering the threshold (a) to see a physician for ARI symptoms and/
or (b) to test a patient presenting with ARI symptoms for respiratory
viruses. On the other hand, in 2020, a considerable fraction of respira-
tory virus diagnostics was performed in test centers, practices focus-
ing on COVID-19 testing. Thus, we can not completely rule out the
possibility that the composition of sentinel specimens obtained in
2020 differed from that of previous years, which might affect compa-
rability.
In summary, we have examined a portion of the population with
ARI over the course of 38 weeks in 2020, spanning the summer sea-
son following the most substantial implementation of NPIs in modern
German history. Our observations indicate that NPIs in early spring,
followed by a mask mandate, may be extremely effective at reducing
respiratory virus circulation. With mask mandates and many physical
distancing measures remaining in place influenza detections in our
sentinel were virtually absent during the subsequent winter season,
as our preliminary data analyses have revealed (data not shown).
This indicates that influenza activity in Germany was at at historically
low levels throughout the 2020/21 winter season, mirroring the
observations made during Southern hemisphere winter [5,7][3]. An
impressive rebound of rhinovirus, also reported from the Southern
hemisphere, was noted in young children first. It may result not only
from distinct virological features of this agent but also from immuno-
logical naïvete of and less physical distancing in young children. It is
worth noting that rhinovirus has been the most common respiratory
pathogen isolated in adults with community-acquired pneumonia,
although its role is not fully understood yet [50]; and that rhinovi-
ruses belong to one of five viral groups considered likely sources of
future global catastrophic biological risk [18]. Systematic virological
surveillance for these agents is currently lacking, at least on a global
scale. Given their pandemic potential, building active laboratory-
based sentinels targeting these and other respiratory RNA viruses is a
global health imperative.
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